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Attacking Chevron: A Guide for Practitioners
Anthony Caso
INTRODUCTION
This Article is meant to assist advocates who find themselves
fighting against Chevron deference—the argument that courts
should cede to the administrative agencies the task of
“interpreting” the text of the Act of Congress that is claimed to
support agency actions. After a brief discussion of how Chevron
deference works, this Article examines the problem of separation
of powers that is inherent in the deference doctrine. The Article
then turns to how to attack the deference doctrine when it is
asserted as a defense by agencies.
Chevron deference is employed when an agency regulation is
attacked as inconsistent with or beyond the scope of the federal law
the agency is enforcing.1 Under Chevron, the courts first determine
whether the statutory provision at issue is ambiguous and second
whether the administrative agency’s interpretation of that statute
is “reasonable.”2 So long as the agency has rule-making authority
and the interpretation at issue was not developed in the midst of
litigation over the disputed statutory test, the courts will give
binding deference to “reasonable” agency interpretations.3 Under
Chevron, when there is an ambiguity or gap in the legislative
scheme, the court treats that ambiguity as a congressional
delegation of power to the agency to fill the gaps and make policy to
resolve the ambiguity.4 In other words, the courts hand over their
authority to interpret law to the agency and assume Congress
handed over its authority to make law to the agency.
 Professor of Law, Dale E. Fowler School of Law and Director of the Constitutional
Jurisprudence Clinic, Chapman University, J.D. 1979, University of the Pacific,
McGeorge School of Law, M.B.A. 1999, Golden Gate University. I would like to thank the
United States Justice Foundation, which sponsored the Separation of Powers Project of
the Constitutional Jurisprudence Clinic, which made this conference and this Article
possible. I would also like to thank Dr. John Eastman who worked so hard to recruit
speakers for the conference and who, as Dean of the School of Law at Chapman invited
me to come to Southern California to take over as the Director of the Clinic.
1 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
2 See id. at 843–44.
3 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27, 229 (2001); Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988).
4 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44.
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The problem of Chevron deference was demonstrated in
Justice Kagan’s concurring opinion (joined by Justice Breyer) in
the recent decision in Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and
Paul Home v. Pennsylvania.5 The issue before the Court was
whether the Department of Health and Human Services, the
Department of Labor, and the Treasury Department
(“Departments”) had authority under the Affordable Care Act to
promulgate a regulation exempting employers with religious or
moral objections from providing no-cost contraceptive coverage in
the group insurance policy.6 Did Congress grant that authority to
the Departments in the statute? Justice Kagan wrote that she
could find no clarity in the statute on the question.7
If I had to, I would of course decide which is the marginally better
reading. But Chevron deference was built for cases like these. See
Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842–843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); see also
Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 301, 133 S.Ct. 1863, 185 L.Ed.2d 941
(2013) (holding that Chevron applies to questions about the scope of
an agency’s statutory authority). Chevron instructs that a court facing
statutory ambiguity should accede to a reasonable interpretation by
the implementing agency. The court should do so because the agency
is the more politically accountable actor. See 467 U.S. at 865–866, 104
S.Ct. 2778. And it should do so because the agency’s expertise often
enables a sounder assessment of which reading best fits the statutory
scheme. See id., at 865, 104 S.Ct. 2778.8

The statute is not clear, in Justice Kagan’s view. Indeed, the
statute says nothing about a requirement to provide no-cost
contraceptive coverage nor the Departments’ authority, or
requirement, to provide a religious exemption to such a
requirement.9 Thus she “would defer to the Departments’ view of
the scope of Congress’s delegation.”10 In this view, Chevron
deference both does the job that Congress did not do (writing a
clear statute) and the job the judiciary should do (interpret legal
texts). In both instances, Chevron deference departs from the
scheme of separated powers embedded in the Constitution.
Chevron implements the vision of Woodrow Wilson, the
father of modern administrative law. Wilson disputed the need
for separation of powers and instead argued for administrative

5
6
7
8
9
10

140 S. Ct. 2367, 2397–400 (2020) (Kagan, J., concurring).
Id. at 2372–73 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2397 (Kagan, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 2373 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2400 (Kagan, J., concurring).
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officials with “large powers and unhampered discretion.”11
Chevron deference takes us a long way down the road to Wilson’s
dream of administrators with “large powers and unhampered
discretion.”12 Chevron deference, in Justice Kagan’s view, gives
the administrator the “large power” to write into the law that
which Congress left out, and the seemingly “unhampered
discretion” to do so by excluding the judiciary from its job of legal
interpretation.13
First, this Article shows that the argument that Congress
intended agencies to “interpret” the statute and “fill in the
blanks” cannot be justified with reference to the text. Next, the
Article demonstrates that separation of powers is a key
structural element of the U.S. Constitution and that Chevron
deference upends that structure of separated powers. The
doctrine of deference allows administrative agencies to usurp the
power of legislation, and it allows agencies to displace the courts
as interpreters of congressional acts. Congress cannot delegate
lawmaking any more than the courts can delegate their duty to
decide cases or controversies.
Much of this is not new but is intended to give the advocate
the necessary background to make the arguments. All of this is
prelude to consideration of what an advocate should do in order
to overturn or limit Chevron. This Article proposes two tactics.
First, insist on the exceptions. Much like Auer deference to an
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations has been
circumscribed by an ever-growing list of exceptions,14 Chevron
deference can also be limited—some limitations have already
been imposed by judicial decision. Second, the advocate should
insist that the courts return to their job of statutory
construction.15 Chevron only applies if the court finds the statute
ambiguous after exhausting all of the tools of statutory
interpretation. These tools of statutory construction do not allow
deference to the agency where the meaning of a statute cannot be
fixed.16
Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197, 213–14 (July 1887).
Id.
13 See Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S.
Ct. 2367, 2397 (2020) (Kagan, J., concurring).
14 Kisor v. Wilke, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2414–15 (2019).
15 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (“The
judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject
administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent.”).
16 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 134 (2012) (“There are sometimes statutes which no rule or canon of
interpretation can make effective or applicable to the situations of fact which they purport
to govern. In such cases the statute must simply fail.” (citation omitted)).
11
12
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Before discussing separation of powers, however, the Article
discusses the question of whether Congress intended the courts
to defer to executive agencies on questions of the meaning of
legislative texts. That is, whether Chevron is a creature of
legislative intent or one of judicial creation.
I. THE MYTH THAT DEFERENCE FLOWS FROM CONGRESSIONAL
INTENT
The Supreme Court has often repeated the claim that
Congress intended for the courts to defer to the judgment of
agencies when interpreting a statute.17 This congressional intent
is claimed to be found where Congress left a gap in the statutory
scheme and gave rule-making authority to the agency.18 The
Court has even described this as an “express delegation of
specific interpretive authority” to the agency.19 The Court
explained its thought process on the idea that Chevron deference
was intended by Congress as follows:
We accord deference to agencies under Chevron, not because of a
presumption that they drafted the provisions in question, or were
present at the hearings, or spoke to the principal sponsors; but rather
because of a presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a
statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the
ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and
desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree
of discretion the ambiguity allows.20

The problem with this line of thought is that there is no
reference to any actual statute or congressional text expressing
such an intent.21 Professor Hamburger observed: “As a result of
Chevron’s presumption from ambiguity, the courts have ended up
in the peculiar position of basing their deference on statutory
authorization while presuming such authorization from what the
statutes do not say.”22
Further, this theory of implied congressional intent forces
the courts to ignore the one clear statement from Congress on
who should interpret the statute.23 Section 706 of the
Administrative Procedure Act provides: “To the extent necessary
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44.
See Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 173–74 (2007); see also
King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 485 (2015).
19 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
20 Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996).
21 See id.; see also Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187,
1192 n.15 (2016).
22 Hamburger, supra note 21.
23 See id.
17
18
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to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide
all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability
of the terms of an agency action.”24 The phrase “decide all
relevant questions of law” does not appear to be ambiguous.25 “It
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is.”26 But Congress, in the Administrative
Procedure Act, decided to remove any doubt on the question by
specifying that the reviewing court is tasked with the duty to
“interpret constitutional and statutory provisions.”27
Rulemaking authority granted in a statutory scheme is often
specific and reveals no intent to set up agencies as the final
arbiter of the meaning of federal law. For instance, the Clean Air
Act orders the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency to issue regulations prescribing air quality standards for
designated air pollutants.28 Nothing is said about the EPA’s
authority to interpret the statute. Sometimes the statute grants
a broad-ranging authority to an agency. One example is found in
the Communications Act of 1934 where Congress granted the
Federal Communications Commission the authority to “prescribe
such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public
interest to carry out the provisions of this chapter.”29 The
rulemaking authority there is quite broad, but it says nothing
about displacing the courts’ traditional function of interpreting
the law.
Congress did not leave much room for the courts to presume a
contrary intent from statutory silence. If there was evidence of such
an intent, there would be no basis for the courts to refuse to apply
Chevron deference when an agency has failed to invoke the doctrine
or has affirmatively waived it. But as Justice Gorsuch has noted,
[the] Court has often declined to apply Chevron deference when the
government fails to invoke it. See Eskridge & Baer, The Continuum of
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory
Interpretations From Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L. J. 1083, 11211124 (2008) (collecting cases); Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive
Precedent, 101 Yale L. J. 969, 982-984 (1992) (same); see BNSF R. Co.
v. Loos, 586 U. S. ––––, 139 S.Ct. 893 (2019).30

5 U.S.C. § 706.
Id.
26 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
27 5 U.S.C. § 706; see Hamburger, supra note 21, at 1192 n.15 (citing Thomas W.
Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 994–95 (1992)).
28 42 U.S.C. § 7409.
29 47 U.S.C. § 201(b).
30 Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 140 S. Ct. 789, 790
24
25
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Nor can the courts base continued application of Chevron
deference on a theory of congressional acquiescence. There have
been instances where the courts have found “Congress’ failure to
disturb a consistent judicial interpretation of a statute” as some
evidence of congressional intent.31 However, with Chevron deference
we are not talking about the consistent interpretation of a single
statute. It is certainly not an interpretation of the judicial review
provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act. Nothing in the Act
permits the implication that issues of statutory interpretation are
committed to agency discretion. Precisely the opposite is true. The
Act expressly commits those questions to the courts. Further,
Chevron deference is a doctrine that is applied to every statute
conferring authority on an executive agency to make regulations.32
Chevron deference may be the preferred policy of the judiciary.
There is no evidence, however, that it represents the intent of
Congress.
Finally, the Supreme Court in Mead ruled that Chevron
deference was only available to regulations enacted pursuant to the
notice and comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act
(or Orders issued through APA adjudication).33 Yet the courts have
not explained how this is consistent with the theory that Congress
intended to leave the question up to the agency. If Congress is
relying on agency expertise, what is the purpose of notice and
comment procedures? Under the notice and comment provisions of
the APA, the agency must publish notice of proposed rulemaking
and then allow the public a period of time to comment on the
proposal.34 The agency must then respond to the comments.35 If the
agency decides to alter the proposal significantly, it must publish a
new notice of proposed rulemaking starting the process all over.36
The procedure is intended to ensure that the public, and regulated
parties, have fair notice of and opportunity to comment on the
regulation.37
How does a requirement that the agency respond to public
comments on a proposed regulation show that Congress desired to
leave the policy up to the agency? The notice and comment
procedural requirements are instead evidence that Congress does not
entirely trust the agency’s decisions on policymaking and gap-filling.
(2020) (mem.) (statement of Gorsuch, J.).
31 Monessen Sw. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 338 (1988).
32 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
33 See id.
34 5 U.S.C. § 553; Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 96 (2015).
35 Perez, 575 U.S. at 96.
36 See Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 173 (2007).
37 Id. at 174.
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These procedural requirements show that Congress did not leave the
agency free to act on its own. Nothing in the APA demonstrates that
Congress gave the agency the authority to regulate free of
interference from the courts on the question of whether the
regulation comports with the statute enacted by Congress.
In any event, Congress has no power to confer either law-making
power or judicial power on executive agencies.38
II. THE PROBLEM OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
Chevron deference has administrative agencies usurping the
judicial role of interpreting legal texts and the congressional role
of enacting legislation. If the legislation is so vague as to have
multiple or no discernable meaning, the agency is effectively
exercising Congress’ lawmaking power when it “interprets” the
legislation. Agencies are left to fill gaps in the statutory
framework and to make policy.39 This administrative action is
further insulated from meaningful review when the judiciary
defers to the agency interpretation. Chevron creates the perfect
storm for destruction of separation of powers limits that are
embedded in the structure of the Constitution.
Separation of the powers of government is a foundational
principle of our constitutional system. There can be little debate
that separation of powers was considered an essential component
in the plan of government by the Framers. Even before a national
constitution was ever considered, the founding generation made
sure that newly formed state governments were based on
separated powers.
In Virginia, the Fifth Revolutionary Convention approved
the Declaration of Rights in June of 1776 that insisted that
“legislative and executive powers . . . should be separate and
distinct from the judiciary.”40 The new Virginia Constitution
adopted that same month also required that the branches of
government be “separate and distinct” and commanded that they
not “exercise the powers properly belonging to the other.”41

38 John C. Eastman, The President’s Pen and the Bureaucrat’s Fiefdom, 40 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639 (2017); see A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 529 (1935); Panama Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 428–29 (1935).
39 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)
(quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
40 VIR. DEC. OF RIGHTS (1776), reprinted in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION DIGITAL EDITION 530 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds.,
2009).
41 CONST. OF 1776, reprinted in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION DIGITAL EDITION 533 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2009).
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The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 contained a similar
provision and added the purpose of separated powers “to the end
it may be a government of laws and not of men.”42
The denial of separated powers was among the complaints
listed against the crown in the Declaration of Independence. 43
Justice Story notes that the first resolution adopted by the
Constitutional Convention in 1787 was for a plan of government
consisting of three separate branches of government.44
The Framers and Ratifiers of the Constitution understood
that separation of powers was necessary to protect individual
liberty. In this, the founding generation relied on the works of
Montesquieu, Blackstone, and Locke for the proposition that
institutional separation of powers was an essential protection
against arbitrary government.45
These warnings against consolidated power resulted in
structural separation of power protections in the design of the
federal government.46 That design divided the power of the
national government into three distinct branches, vesting the
legislative authority in Congress, the executive power in the
President, and the judicial responsibilities in the Supreme Court
and lower federal courts.47
The ratification debates demonstrate the importance of this
separation to the founding generation. The argument was not
whether to separate power, but whether the proposed
constitution separated power enough.48 Fearing that the mere
prohibition of one branch exercising the powers of another was
insufficient, the Framers designed a system that vested each
42 MASS. CONST. OF 1780, reprinted in 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION DIGITAL EDITION 445 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds.,
2009).
43 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 9–10 (U.S. 1776) (noting obstruction
of “the administration of justice” and the king’s power to make “judges dependent on his
will alone”).
44 See 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 519 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., Little, Brown, & Co., 5th ed. 1905) (1833).
45 See, e.g., MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 152 (Franz Neumann ed.,
Thomas Nugent trans., Hafner Publ’g Co. 1949) (1748); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 150–51 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1992)
(1765); JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 82 (Thomas P. Peardon ed.,
Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1997) (1690).
46 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 267 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001); THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra, at 249, 251 (James Madison); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 9, supra, at 38 (Alexander Hamilton); see also Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to John Adams (Sept. 28, 1787), in 1 THE ADAMS-JEFFERSON LETTERS 199, 199
(Lester J. Cappon ed., 1959).
47 Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
48 THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 46, at 256 (James Madison).
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branch with the power necessary to resist encroachment by
another.49 Madison argued that what the anti-federalists saw as
a violation of separation of powers was in fact the checks and
balances necessary to enforce separation.50
James Madison explained that a mere prohibition on
exercising the powers of another branch of government was not
sufficient: such prohibitions were mere “parchment barriers.”51
Thus, the Constitution was designed to give each branch the
power to protect its powers from the other branches.52 Because
the three powers of government were not equal, the
constitutional design does not have a pure separation of powers.
To accomplish an equilibration of power, the Constitution gives
each branch some limited role in the operation of the other
branches.53 Thus, for example, the Executive wields the power to
veto legislation, while the Judiciary wields the power to
determine the meaning of laws and whether they comport with
the Constitution.54 Leaving interpretation of laws to the
lawmaking branch, according to Blackstone, is an invitation to
“partiality and oppression.”55 Sensible toMindful of this danger,
the Framers vested these powers in the judicial branch.56
The Supreme Court has also recognized that Separation of
Powers is the core structural principal of the Constitution.57 As
Justice Kennedy explained:

Id.
Id.; THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 46, at 268–69 (James Madison); see also
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
51 THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 46, at 256 (James Madison).
52 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 46, at 268–69 (James Madison).
53 Id. at 267–68.
54 At first blush, it appears that the checks and balances designed into the
Constitution did not have the desired effect. However, then-Judge Kavanaugh noted that
Chevron deference “encourages the Executive Branch . . . to be extremely aggressive in
seeking to squeeze its policy goals into ill-fitting statutory authorizations . . . .” Brett
Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2150 (2016)
(reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)). The adoption of the
Chevron doctrine empowers the Executive at the expense of the Legislature. If there is a
failure in the system of checks and balances, it is found in the refusal of the courts to
enforce the separation of powers.
55 BLACKSTONE, supra note 45, at 58.
56 See FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 46 at 268–69 (James Madison).
57 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008) (“[P]ersonal liberty . . . is secured
by adherence to the separation of powers.”); Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for
Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 272 (1991) (“The ultimate purpose of this
separation of powers is to protect the liberty and security of the governed.”); Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (“This Court consistently has given voice to, and
has reaffirmed, the central judgment of the Framers of the Constitution that, within our
political scheme, the separation of governmental powers into three coordinate Branches is
essential to the preservation of liberty.”).
49
50
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In recent years, perhaps, we have come to think of liberty as defined
by that word in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and as
illuminated by the other provisions of the Bill of Rights. The
conception of liberty embraced by the Framers was not so confined.
They used the principles of separation of powers and federalism to
secure liberty in the fundamental political sense of the term, quite in
addition to the idea of freedom from intrusive governmental acts. The
idea and the promise were that when the people delegate some degree
of control to a remote central authority, one branch of government
ought not possess the power to shape their destiny without a sufficient
check from the other two. In this vision, liberty demands limits on the
ability of any one branch to influence basic political decisions.58

The doctrine of Chevron deference, however, breaches this
core doctrine of separation of powers in two fundamental ways.
First, it allows executive agencies to exercise Congress’s power to
legislate Constitution vests the power to make laws solely in
Congress and strictly limits how those laws can be made. Second,
Chevron deference impermissibly allows executive agencies to
exercise the Judiciary’s well-settled power “to say what the law
is.”59
III. CHEVRON DEFERENCE ALLOWS THE EXECUTIVE TO EXERCISE
LEGISLATIVE POWER
Chevron deference involves an explicit recognition that
administrative agencies make “law”—that is to say, agencies
promulgate substantive legal obligations (or prohibitions) that
bind individuals. Pursuant to the doctrine, courts may not
interfere with agency lawmaking so long as the congressional
enactment is ambiguous, the agency has both expertise and
rulemaking authority, and the agency’s interpretation is at least
a possible interpretation of the law.60 The courts have recognized
that agencies are clearly involved in lawmaking when they enact
substantive rules that are subject to Chevron deference.61 There
are two problems with deference in this regard. First, the
Constitution assigns lawmaking exclusively to Congress. Second,
reflecting the Founders’ fears over the power of legislative
branch, the Constitution specifies a particular procedure through

58 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450–51 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
59 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803).
60 There is no requirement for the agency construction of the statute to be the best
interpretation. Indeed, under Chevron the agency is even empowered to subsequently
change its mind about what the statute means. See Nat’l Cable and Telecomms. Ass’n v.
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981–83 (2005).
61 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 233 (2001).
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which laws are to be made.62 Agencies do not follow that
procedure when promulgating regulations.63
Article I, section 1, clause 1 of the Constitution provides: “All
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of
the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives.”64 This is the first of the three “vesting
clauses”65 that sets out the basic plan of government under the
Constitution and that provide the framework for the scheme of
separated powers. Powers vested in one branch under the vesting
clause cannot be ceded to or usurped by another.66
The legislative power is the power to alter “the legal rights,
duties and relations of persons.”67 This is the same definition
given to “substantive rules” adopted by administrative agencies.
Section 551 of the Administrative Procedure Act defines the term
“rule” as an agency statement that prescribes “law or policy.”68
These are “laws” that impose “legally binding obligations or
prohibitions” on individuals.69 It is difficult to see much space
between agency “rules” and the “legislation” that Article I of the
Constitution reserved exclusively to Congress.70 Responding to
the point that “some administrative agency action—rulemaking,
for example—may resemble ‘lawmaking,’” the Supreme Court
noted that agency action will always be limited to mere executive
administration of the laws “because . . . [the agency’s]
administrative activity cannot reach beyond the limits of the
statute that created it.”71 If the question is whether Congress has
delegated a power reserved exclusively to Congress, the Chadha
Court noted that the courts were available to ensure that
administrative agencies adhered to “the will of Congress.”72
Those checks were largely illusory before Chadha was
decided. The idea of ensuring that agency activity “cannot reach
beyond the limits of the statute that created it” requires a statute
with definable limits. If courts cannot determine the limits of
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
See Administrative Procedural Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 et seq.
64 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1.
65 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; U.S. Const. Art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
66 E.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 575 U.S. 43, 67–68 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
67 See Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983).
68 The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq.
69 Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 123 n.4 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
70 See Hamburger, supra note 21, at 1194 n.21, 1196; Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury
and the Administrative State, 83 C OLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1983).
71 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953 n.16.
72 Id.
62
63
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congressional will, there is no standard for them to enforce.73 In
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States74 the Supreme Court
came up with a theory that so long as Congress set down an
“intelligible principle” for agency action, that was sufficient to
avoid a conclusion that the Congress had impermissibly
delegated its lawmaking power to the executive branch.75
However, the idea that this doctrine requiring an “intelligible
principle” would actually provide an enforceable norm was very
short lived. Just four years after the J.W. Hampton decision, the
Supreme Court ruled that a requirement for the agency to
regulate in the “public interest” was a sufficient intelligible
principle.76 These decisions stripped both “intelligible” and
“principle” from the standard, leaving Congress free to delegate
that which the Constitution explicitly vests in Congress and
Congress alone.
In any event, neither of the checks touted by the Chadha
Court continue to exist under Chevron. Under Chevron, it is the
agency that has the last word on whether the agency’s action
reaches beyond the limits of the statute. The most the courts will
do is determine whether the agency interpretation of the statute
is “reasonable”—that is, whether the agency’s interpretation is a
possible construction of the statute, though not necessarily the
best reading. Further, the courts no longer ensure that agencies
adhere to the will of Congress, since Chevron deference requires
courts to defer to the agency’s determination of Congress’s will.77
By taking the courts out of the role that the Chadha Court
thought critical, Chevron deference invites the administrative
agency to usurp Congress’s power to make law.78 Further, it

Id.
276 U.S. 394 (1928).
Id. at 409.
76 See N.Y. Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24–25 (1932); Nat’l Broad.
Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225–26 (1943).
77 Of course, the courts are only supposed to defer once they determine that the
statute is ambiguous. This requires the courts to use all of the tools of statutory
construction to determine the meaning of the law. See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v.
Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,
132–33 (2000); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9
(1984). If the statute remains ambiguous once all the tools of statutory interpretation
have been exhausted, a different problem is presented. See Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S.
743, 762–63 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“For if we give the ‘force of law’ to agency
pronouncements on matters of private conduct as to which ‘“Congress did not actually
have an intent,”’ we permit a body other than Congress to perform a function that
requires an exercise of the legislative power. . . . It is the power to decide—without any
particular fidelity to the text—which policy goals EPA wishes to pursue.”) (internal
citations omitted).
78 Kavanaugh, supra note 54 at 2151.
73
74
75
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invites Congress to increasingly delegate its lawmaking power to
administrative agencies.79 The result in either instance is that
agencies in the Executive branch of government combine
lawmaking with law execution in a single office. This is
something that the structure of the Constitution was designed to
prevent.80 As the Supreme Court has noted on many occasions,
this combination of powers in a single office is a threat to
individual liberty.81
To that end, Congress cannot delegate its lawmaking power.
The text of the Constitution is clear that the power of
legislation—at least as far as the Constitution permits legislation
at all—is reserved exclusively to Congress.82 The Constitution
further limits how legislation can be made. Congress’s power to
make law can only be exercised by following a specific
procedure.83 According to the text, Congress can only act
pursuant to “a single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered, procedure”84 that includes bicameralism (the
requirement that a measure be approved by both houses of
Congress) and presentment (allowing the President the
opportunity to veto the legislation).85 The Supreme Court
recognized that these provisions might prevent Congress from
acting in an efficient manner. However, “[c]onvenience and
efficiency are not the primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of
democratic government . . . .”86
The system built by the founding generation was
purposefully inefficient. Under the Constitution, the legislative
branch is divided into two houses, each selected by a different
manner.87 No bill can become law until it has been enacted by
both houses of the Legislature and then presented to the
President for approval.88 This is a cumbersome process but one
that those who framed and ratified the Constitution thought
necessary to preserve liberty.89
Michigan, 576 U.S. at 762–63 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450–51 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
81 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 46 at 268–69 (James Madison); see also
Boumediene v. Bush, 533 U.S. 723, 172–43 (2008).
82 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 1, cl. 1.
83 See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 750 (2006); Immigr. & Naturalization
Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
84 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
85 Id. at 946–51.
86 Id. at 944.
87 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3.
88 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
89 JAMES MCCLELLAN, LIBERTY, ORDER, AND JUSTICE 339 (Liberty Fund, Inc. 3d ed.,
79
80
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A unicameral legislative body would certainly have been
more efficient, but most of the colonial governments had moved
to a bicameral legislature by the time the Constitution was being
drafted.90 The Framers were concerned that a powerful
legislative branch at the federal level would be a threat to
liberty.91 They had learned that it was nearly impossible to
restrain the legislative power when vested in only one body.92 As
James Wilson would later remark: “A single legislature is
calculated to unite in it all the pernicious qualities of the
different extremes of bad government.”93
James Madison explained, “[i]n republican government, the
legislative authority necessarily predominates.”94 The remedy
was to split the legislative branch into two houses. 95 This fit into
the scheme of divided power meant to preserve liberty.96 By the
time of the framing of the Constitution, the idea that the
legislature had to be divided was a view held by “most persons of
sound reflection.”97 It was for these reasons that the Constitution
specified a “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedure” for enactment of federal law.98
Deferring to agency “gap-filling” and “policy making,”
however, allows executive branch agencies to “make law” without
following this single, finely wrought procedure. There is no need
of political compromise or consensus building. There is no
procedure for deliberation and there is certainly no element of
republican government. Law is not proposed by representatives,
it is imposed by executive branch employees.
2000) (1989) ("Speed, however, is not a virtue in the political process crafted by the
Framers. The system is intended to promote careful deliberation, which is timeconsuming, to be sure, but necessary to build a consensus so that the decision finally
made has broad support.").
90 See FEDERAL FARMER: AN ADDITIONAL NUMBER OF LETTERS TO THE REPUBLICAN,
(New York, May 2, 1788) reprinted in 20 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION DIGITAL EDITION 985–86 (John P. Kaminski et al.
eds., 2009).
91 See JAMES WILSON, OF GOVERNMENT, THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT, LECTURES
ON LAW 1791, reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 377, 377 (Philip B. Kurland &
Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 46, at 269 (James Madison).
95 Id.
96 See ST. GEORGE TUCKER, Of the Several Forms of Government, in VIEW OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SELECTED WRITINGS 21, 48 (1999); see also
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 46, at 268–69 (James Madison).
97 JOSEPH STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, § 547 (1833), reprinted
in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 378, 378 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987).
98 Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
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One argument for Chevron deference is that executive
branch agencies are more politically accountable than the
courts.99 There are two responses. First, the courts are not
supposed to be politically accountable. They are supposed to
operate outside of politics and render judgment on the matters
brought before them.100 Second, executive agencies are not
politically accountable. Rules cannot be changed simply because
the individual occupying the Office of President has changed. 101
Further, it is unlikely that the President could control the
behavior of administrative agencies at that fine of a level.102 Even
if one were to assume that the President had direct, day-to-day
control over all of the executive agencies (including the so-called
“independent agencies” which are designed to operate outside of
the three branches of government), that does not alter the fact
that the agencies are making law outside of the Constitutional
procedure.
IV. CHEVRON DEFERENCE ALLOWS THE EXECUTIVE TO EXERCISE
JUDICIAL POWER
Article III, § 1 of the Constitution vests the “judicial power”
in the “Supreme Court and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may . . . establish.”103 In a scheme of separated powers,
the key to judicial power is the “interpretation of the law.”104 This
is a power that must be separated from both execution and
legislation. Quoting Montesquieu, Justice Story notes “there is no
liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the
legislative and executive powers.”105 The purpose of the judiciary
is to stand as a neutral arbiter between the legislative and
executive branches—a necessary check on the political branches
of government.106 The separate judicial power allows the courts to

99 See Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S.
Ct. 2367, 2397 (2020) (Kagan, J., concurring).
100 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 46, at 405–06 (Alexander Hamilton).
101 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42,
48 (1983).
102 See City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 313–14 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
103 U.S. CONST . art. III, § 1.
104 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 46, at 404 (Alexander Hamilton); Perez v.
Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 119–20 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
105 JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, § 1568 (1833), reprinted
in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 200, 200 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987).
106 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 46, at 405 (Alexander Hamilton).
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serve as “bulwarks” for liberty.107 This requires that judges have
the power to “declare the sense of the law.”108
The scheme for balancing power between the branches of
government depends on each branch exercising the full extent of
its power.109 In order to keep the political branches in check, the
courts may not surrender their power to interpret the law to
either of the political branches. The failure to exercise this duty
would be an invitation to “partiality and oppression.”110 Each
branch of government must support and defend the Constitution
and thus must interpret the Constitution.111 The Courts may not,
however, cede their judicial power to interpret the laws to the
Executive.112 The judicial branch accomplishes its role by ruling
on the legality of the actions of the executive and giving “binding
and conclusive” interpretations to acts of Congress.113 Had the
Constitution not assigned such a role to the judiciary as a
separate branch, the plan of government “could not be
successfully carried into effect.”114
Chevron deference, however, alters this framework in a way
that the separation of judicial from executive power is no longer
enforced. It is no longer the exclusive province of the courts to
interpret congressional enactments. Instead, the court now treats
the existence of an “ambiguity” as meaning that Congress
intended the agency, and only the agency, to interpret the
statute. So long as the agency interpretation is “reasonable,”
Chevron requires the courts to cede their judicial power to the
executive and approve the agency interpretation.
The Supreme Court took this line of argument to its logical
extreme in National Cable & Telecommunications Association
v. Brand X Internet Services.115 There, the court ruled that Chevron
deference applied to the FCCs decision that cable internet providers
did not provide “telecommunications service” as defined by the
Communications Act, and thus were exempt from common carrier
regulation.116 That part of the decision is not surprising. The

Id.
Id.; see Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983).
109 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 46, at 269 (James Madison).
110 BLACKSTONE, supra note 45, at 58.
111 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974).
112 See id.
113 WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, reprinted
in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 195, 195 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987).
114 Id.
115 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
116 Id. at 977, 981.
107
108
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Communications Act is a model of ambiguity, its provisions not
anticipating the rapid evolution of broadband internet. The court was
even willing to grant Chevron deference for a changed interpretation
of the statute by the agency.117 The statute had not changed, the
agency’s policy had changed. That, however, is more a problem of
agency lawmaking as discussed in the prior section. The innovation
introduced by Brand X is that the agency interpretation of
Communications Act ran contrary to a Court of Appeals
interpretation of the same provision in a prior case.118 The Supreme
Court ruled that Chevron required the Court of Appeals to ignore its
prior ruling interpreting the Communications Act and instead defer
to the Commission’s new interpretation.119 In effect, the Supreme
Court ruled that the agency had the power to overrule an Article III
court on a question of statutory interpretation.120 The Court justified
this by asserting that the agency was not engaged in statutory
interpretation but rather “gap-filling.”121
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to limit or overrule
Brand X in United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC.122 At
issue there was whether a subsequent regulation by the IRS
could overrule a long-standing Supreme Court interpretation of
the statute.123 The Court ruled no—but not because it amounted
to interference with the judicial power. Nor was the problem that
the prior ruling was from the Supreme Court, as opposed to the
Circuit Court of Appeals, as was the case in Brand X. Although
the Supreme Court had noted in its prior ruling that the statute
at issue was “ambiguous,” that ruling was several decades before
the Chevron ruling.124 It seems that the court was saying that
“ambiguous” may mean something different in the Chevron era.
Further, the court argued that the interpretation set by the
Supreme Court in the prior ruling “had the better side of the
textual argument.”125 However, Chevron deference rulings
consistently note that the agency’s interpretation need not be the
“best” reading of the statute.126 So long as the agency’s reading is
“reasonable” the court must defer.127 Thus, it is hard to say what
impact, if any, Concrete Home will have on Brand X. A close read
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127

Id. at 981.
Id. at 982.
Id. at 982–83.
See id.
Id.
United States. v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478 (2012).
Id. at 481–82.
Id. at 488–89.
Id. at 489.
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005).
Id.
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of the case reveals that there is nothing in the majority opinion
that challenges the Brand X holding that administrative
agencies have the power to overrule prior court decisions.
A legislature cannot overrule a court, although it can enact a
new law to avoid the effect of a ruling.128 Similarly, prior rulings
have held that the executive branch was bound to follow a final
judgment of a court.129 But Brand X holds that the executive is
not bound at all by a judicial ruling on the interpretation of an
Act of Congress.130 Under Brand X, if it is a statute dealing with
agency power and the court can find an ambiguity, the agency is
free to come to a conclusion different from that reached by the
court and the court must accept the agency’s interpretation.131
The Brand X decision makes Montesquieu’s worst fears of
combined power a reality. An executive agency now has the
power to make law (substantive rules that obligate individuals),
enforce those laws, and to interpret its own authority to make
those laws, free from judicial interference. The judicial,
legislative, and executive powers are firmly held in a single hand.
Under Chevron deference, the regime of separated powers
has come to an end. The agency now makes law, is the ultimate
interpreter of its authority to make law, and executes the law it
makes. Whatever the Supreme Court’s motivation for developing
this deference doctrine, it is clearly a doctrine that stands in
opposition to the fundamental structure of the Constitution.
Those who seek to resurrect the rule of separated powers
have their work cut out for them. Chevron has been in place for a
long time and some members of the Supreme Court are unwilling
to overturn precedent—even in cases that they believe were
wrongly decided.132 Still, there are two specific grounds of attack
that can help rebuild the separation of powers structure of the
Constitution. First, advocates can work on building exceptions to
the Chevron deference doctrine so that deference becomes the
exception rather than the rule. Second, advocates can focus on
Step 1 of the Chevron analysis and insist that the courts actually
use all of the tools of statutory interpretation before concluding
that the law is ambiguous. Finally, if after all the tools of
statutory construction have been used the law is still ambiguous,

See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218–19 (1995).
See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 197 (2012).
130 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 983–84.
131 Id.
132 See, e.g., June Med. Servs. LLC v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2133–35 (2020)
(Roberts, C.J., concurring); Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2422 (2019).
128
129
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the advocate should argue that Congress has failed to enact a law
at all but has instead attempted an unconstitutional delegation
of its lawmaking power to the Executive branch.
V. ATTACKING CHEVRON – LIMITING EXCEPTIONS
One way to limit a rule is build a fence of exceptions around
its application. An example of this is another type of deference in
Administrative Law that also raised serious separation of powers
concerns—Auer deference. Under Auer deference, courts are
required to give controlling deference to an agency’s
interpretation of its own rules.133 With Auer deference, the entity
that wrote the rule was also the only entity that could interpret
the rule.134 Justice Scalia, author of the court’s opinion in Auer,
later came to criticize the rule as a violation of separation of
powers and called for overturning that deference doctrine.135 As
the critiques mounted, the court began consciously cataloging the
exceptions to the doctrine that had been noted in prior
decisions.136 Finally, in the 2019 Term, it looked like there were
enough votes to overturn Auer. In Kisor v. Wilkie, however, the
majority narrowed Auer and reemphasized the requirement that
reviewing courts exhaust the traditional tools of statutory
interpretation before finding a sufficient ambiguity that might
raise the issue of deference to the agency interpretation.137 Even
then, the agency interpretation must be a reasonable one.138
Advocates should explore a similar approach for limiting the
scope of Chevron deference. The Supreme Court has already
ruled that Chevron deference is not available when the agency
interpretation of the statute is contained in an opinion letter.139
The court expanded this limitation in United States v. Mead
Corporation140 to rule that Chevron can only apply if Congress
has granted rulemaking (or adjudicatory) authority to the
agency.141 There must be evidence that Congress granted the
authority to issue rules on the subject at issue that carry the
force of law.142 Under these cases, an agency is not granted
133 Christopher v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012); Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–63 (1997).
134 Auer, 519 U.S. at 461.
135 Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 68–69 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
136 See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2414–18.
137 See id. at 2423.
138 Id. at 2422.
139 See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
140 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 254–56 (2001).
141 See id. at 229.
142 See id. at 231–32; see also Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649–50
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Chevron deference if it does not have authority to issue rules (or
binding legal rulings through adjudication) on the specific
question for which it is seeking deference. Further, an argument
can be made that deference should not be granted if the
interpretation in question was not adopted as part of notice and
comment rulemaking or adjudication under the APA.
The Supreme Court has also shown reluctance to grant
deference where the rule is one of “vast ‘economic and political
significance’” in the absence of clear authority from Congress for
the rule.143 Then Judge Kavanaugh framed this as the “major
rules doctrine,” which denies Chevron deference for significant
rules in the absence of clear congressional authorization.144
Justice Breyer referred to these as “important . . . question[s]”
that Congress was more likely to answer itself rather than leave
to an administrative agency.145
The “major rules doctrine” appears to have started with a
case that should have been decided on the question of whether
the agency interpretation was a reasonable one. In MCI
Telecommunications Corp v. AT&T,146 the question was whether
the FCC could interpret the term “modify any requirement” to
allow the Commission to render voluntary a filing that the
statute made mandatory. The Court held that the term “modify”
in the statute could not be read to permit the FCC to eliminate a
statutory requirement.147 As such, no deference was owed
because the interpretation went “beyond the meaning that the
statute can bear.”148 Although cited by the “major rules doctrine”
cases, MCI is better situated as a case where the agency’s
interpretation was not reasonable. Still, advocates can certainly
use this case where the agency strays too far from the apparent
meaning of the statute.
A better case for the beginning of the “major rules doctrine”
is FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco.149 There, the Food and

(1990). But see Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (finding an interpretation by
an agency subject to Chevron deference even where it was not adopted through notice and
comment rulemaking where it was a long-standing interpretation).
143 Util. Air Regul. Grp., v. EPA, 573 U.S., 302, 321, 324 (2014) (quoting FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000)).
144 U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
145 Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L.
REV. 363, 370, 383 (1986).
146 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
147 Id. at 231–32.
148 Id. at 229.
149 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
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Drug Administration claimed authority to regulate tobacco
products under the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act. 150 That law was
enacted in 1938,151 but the FDA did not discover its authority to
regulate tobacco under the Act until 1996.152 Since Congress had
adopted other regulatory programs to cover tobacco products, the
court ruled that tobacco products were not within the agency’s
regulatory authority.153 The court noted, “we are confident that
Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such
economic and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a
fashion.”154
This reasoning was also employed by the court in rejecting
EPA’s attempt to use existing authority under the Clean Air Act
to issue air pollutant standards in order to regulate greenhouse
gases. The court noted that EPA’s interpretation of its authority
under the Clean Air Act “would bring about an enormous and
transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority without
clear congressional authorization.”155
King v. Burwell156 is another case that can be included in the
“major rules doctrine.” The Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act requires the establishment of an “exchange” (an
insurance marketplace for the purchase of health insurance) in
each state.157 If the state failed to create an exchange, the Act
required the federal government to create the exchange for that
state.158 Tax credits were available under the Act for the
purchase of health insurance through “an Exchange established
by the State.”159 The question before the Court was whether an
exchange created by the federal government was “an Exchange
established by the State” for purposes of the tax credit.160 The
Internal Revenue Service promulgated a rule interpreting the
statute as providing tax credits for purchase of insurance
through a federally created exchange.161
The Supreme Court declined to apply Chevron deference to
the IRS rule because it raised a question of “deep ‘economic and

150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161

Id. at 125.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 161.
Id. at 160–61.
Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014).
576 U.S. 473 (2015).
Id. at 483.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 484.
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political significance.’”162 In such cases, the Court is hesitant to
rely on an implied delegation to the administrative agency to
resolve the issue.163 Here, the deciding factor for the Court was
its finding that it was unlikely that Congress would delegate to
the IRS a question regarding health insurance policy.164 Thus,
where the question raises a question of “deep ‘economic and
political significance,’”165 the advocate should explore whether
the agency claiming the benefit of Chevron deference is in fact an
expert on the particular question involved. While the IRS may
have been expert on issues of tax policy and tax credits, it had no
expertise on the program the tax credits were enacted to support.
Without that policy background, the courts are unwilling to
simply to defer to the agency. Even if the agency has expertise on
the issue, the courts require a greater degree of clarity from
showing that Congress intended to delegate resolution of the
question to the agency.
A related doctrine is constitutional avoidance. “Where an
administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer
limits of Congress’ power, we expect a clear indication that
Congress intended that result.”166 The question in Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers was whether the Corps of Engineers could regulate an
isolated body of water (not connected to any other body of water
and completely within the boundaries of a single state)—a
question that pushes the limits of the Congress’s powers under
the Commerce Clause.167 The agency argued that migratory birds
could view the body of water as a potential spot to stop (the
“glancing duck test”)168, and that was sufficient to come within
the Commerce Clause.169 The Court refused to resolve the
question without a clear signal from Congress that it was
pushing such a claim of jurisdiction.170
The advocate can use these existing exceptions as a starting
point for arguing for new exceptions and further limitations on

Id. at 485–86 (quoting 573 U.S. at 324).
Id. at 486.
Id.
165 Id. (quoting Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. at 324).
166 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159,
172 (2001).
167 Id. at 162–64.
168 Larry R. Bianucci & Rew R. Goodenow, The Impact of Section 404 of the Clean
Water Act on Agricultural Land Use, 10 UCLA J. ENV’T. L. & POL'Y 41, 65 (1991).
169 Id. at 164.
170 Id. at 173–74.
162
163
164
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deference. The real battle, however, ought to be over the issue of
statutory interpretation.
VI. ATTACKING CHEVRON—A RETURN TO STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
Chevron deference only applies “if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue.”171 Before a court
can conclude a statute is ambiguous, however, it must first
employ all the tools of statutory interpretation in an attempt to
discern Congress’s intent.172 This requires the court to search for
the statute’s meaning, rather than just attempting to find an
ambiguity. While “clever lawyers - and clever judges - will always
be capable of perceiving some ambiguity in any statute,”173
Justice Scalia noted, “Chevron is . . . not a declaration that, when
statutory construction becomes difficult, we will throw up our
hands and let regulatory agencies do it for us.”174
Statutory interpretation may be the most effective attack
against an agency claiming the benefit of Chevron deference.
However, such a strategy will require the advocate to master not
only the statutory scheme at issue in the case, but also the major
canons of statutory construction.
Then Judge Kavanaugh argued that courts, when faced with
a statutory construction question, should start off with the “best
reading of the text” and then apply the canons of statutory
construction.175
When faced with such a question, one should start with the
text of the specific statute at issue.176 The controlling
presumption is “that a legislature says in a statute what it
means and means in a statute what it says there.”177 Here, you
need to look at the statutory scheme as a whole, and place the
specific statute at issue in context.178 The “best reading” is
arrived at by starting with the words of the statute, the context

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004); Immigr. &
Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446–48 (1987).
173 Abbott Lab’ys v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Edwards, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original).
174 Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 707 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
175 Kavanaugh, supra note 54, at 2121.
176 See Cmty. for Creative Non–Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989); United
States v. Great N. Ry. Co., 287 U.S. 144, 154–55 (1932).
177 Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992).
178 See King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 492 (2015); Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573
U.S. 302, 320 (2014).
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of the statute in the statutory scheme, and the general rules of
the English language.179
A good resource for understanding the canons of statutory
construction is Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner’s book, Reading
Law.180 In addition to explaining the standard canons, the book
provides an extensive bibliography of books and articles on
interpretation of legal texts. For the advocate who needs to
research statutory interpretation, this resource is a good starting
point.
There is one rule of statutory interpretation that is
particularly relevant to the issue of Chevron deference. Chevron
only applies when, after exhausting all of the tools of statutory
construction, the statute remains ambiguous. Under Chevron,
the courts give the agency the power to fix the meaning of a
genuinely ambiguous statute; however, “[t]o give meaning to
what is meaningless is to create a text rather than to interpret
one.”181
The Supreme Court, in Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO
v. American Petroleum Institute,182 was confronted with a
question of what exactly Congress authorized the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration to do to protect workers from
toxic substances. The statute at issue authorized the Secretary to
promulgate health standards “which most adequately assures, to
the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence,
that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or
functional capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to
the hazard . . . for the period of his working life.”183 Did the
statute authorize OSHA to regulate for a “risk free” workplace or
was the agency required to conduct a cost-benefit analysis on the
regulation? If it is required to make a decision on the basis of a
cost-benefit analysis, then how is the agency to draw the line?
What cost is too high, and what benefit is too low?
Then Justice Rehnquist, in his concurring opinion, noted
that Congress “improperly delegated” to the Secretary of Labor
how to balance costs and benefits of the regulation.184 As he
explained, the statute was “completely precatory, admonishing
the Secretary to adopt the most protective standard if he can, but
See Util. Air Regul. Grp., 573 U.S. at 327.
See SCALIA, supra note 16; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the
Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989).
181 See SCALIA, supra note 16, at 134.
182 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
183 Id. at 612.
184 Id. at 672 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
179
180

Do Not Delete

2021]

5/17/2021 9:19 AM

Attacking Chevron: A Guide for Practitioners

657

excusing him from that duty if he cannot.”185 According to Justice
Rehnquist, the statute could not stand because it was a
delegation that failed to provide an intelligible principle, failed to
establish ascertainable limits on the agency’s power under the
statute, and failed to provide congressional decisions on the
“important policy choices” involved with the regulation.186
No other member of the Court joined Justice Rehnquist’s
opinion, but there is increased interest among some of the
current justices in the nondelegation doctrine. The advocate
should not shy away from including these arguments as part of
his or her presentation to the court, especially when the
statutory text is not amenable to clear interpretation after
exhausting all of the tools of statutory construction.
VII. CONCLUSION
Chevron deference is a judicially created doctrine. Although
it purports to be based on implied delegations by Congress, there
is nothing in the text of statutes that agencies implement or the
Administrative Procedure Act that provides support for the
deference doctrine. Indeed, the Administrative Procedure Act
expressly calls on the courts, not the executive, to interpret
statutes and resolve issues of law.
Aside from its creation out of whole cloth, the deference
doctrine upends the structure of separated powers that lies at the
foundation of the Constitution. It allows executive agencies to
exercise the lawmaking power that belongs exclusively to
Congress as well as the judicial power that belongs exclusively to
the judiciary. But advocates need not treat application of
deference as a fait accompli. The purpose of this article is to give
advocates the foundation in the arguments that can be made to
attack deference and ultimately overturn Chevron.
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Id. at 675.
Id. at 685–86.

